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Comments
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE

COMMERcE-FEDERAL CONTROL OF CHILD

Kentucky Whip
and Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. R., the United States Supreme Court held
constitutional an act of Congress2 making it unlawful knowingly to transport in
interstate or foreign commerce goods made by convict labor when they were intended
to be received or used in violation of the laws of the state into which they were
shipped. The act further provided that packages containing convict-made goods
had to be plainly labeled so as to show the names and addresses of the shipper
and consignee, the nature of the contents, and the name and location of the penal
institution where produced. The petitioner in this case manufactured horse collars
and harness with convict labor and tendered them to respondent, a common carrier,
for transportation in interstate commerce. The packages were not labeled and
some of them were consigned to states where the sale of convict-made goods was
prohibited. Respondent refused to accept the shipment. Petitioner sued respondent,
denying the constitutionality of this congressional act and asking for an injunction
to compel the transportation.
The court discussed congressional power under the commerce clause, showing
that this right to control commerce is complete within itself3 and that in certain
instances the right to absolutely prohibit interstate commerce has been upheld.'
It was further pointed out that Congress had lawfully restricted interstate commerce when there was an inherent evil in the thing transported,5 when the purpose
of the transportation was wrongful, 6 and when Congress desired to give effect
to its own policies of interstate commerce which might, incidentally, be shaped in
a manner to aid the enforcement of state laws.7 The fact that the goods involved
in the interstate transportation were harmless was held to be irrelevent in determining whether Congress had the right to regulate."
LABOR AS SUGGESTED BY THE RECENT CONVICT LABOR CAsEs.-In
1

1. 57 Sup. Ct. 277, 81 L. Ed. 183 (1937).
2. Ashurst-Sumners Act, 49 STAT. 494 (1935), 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 61-64 (1929).
3. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 1 (1824).
4. The court cited the following cases in support of this contention: Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (1903) (lottery tickets); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United
States, 220 U. S. 45 (1911) (adulterated articles); Hoke v. United States 227 U. S.
308 (1913) (women for immoral purposes).
5. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 45 (1911).
6. Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (1903); Hoke v. United States, 227
U. S. 308 (1913).
7. Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432 (1925); Gooch v. United States,
297 U. S. 124 (1936)
8. This conclusion was drawn after referring to several cases where the thing
transported was harmless and yet the control over state commerce was held to be
valid. Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432 (1925) (stolen cars); Gooch v. United
States, 297 U. S. 124 (1936) (kidnaped persons).
(341)
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Reference was made to the similarity of methods used in controlling interstate
transportation of intoxicating liquors. By the Wilson Act, 9 passed in 1890 and
upheld in In re Rahrer,'0 intoxicating liquors transported into any state were
subjected upon arrival to the operation of state laws to the same extent as though
they had been produced within the state. Convict-made goods were treated in the
same manner by the Hawes-Cooper Act" passed in 1929. In 1913 the WebbKenyon Act'2 was passed, prohibiting the transportation of intoxicating liquors
into any state when it was intended that they should be received, possessed, or sold
in violation of the laws of that state. Its constitutional validiy was upheld in
3
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co.' These holdings made it easier
for the court to find the convict labor act constitutional.
Previously in Hammer v. Dagenhart 4 the court held unconstitutional a law
restricting the shipment in interstate commerce of goods made by child labor.
It was contended that the Dagenhartcase was a precedent for the Whip & Collar Co.
case and that the congressional provision involved in the latter would be declared
unconstitutional on the strength of the former.' 5 But the court distinguished them
on the basis that the act of Congress in the Dagenhart case had as its aim the
placing of local production under federal control, while the purpose of the act in
the Whip & Collar Co. case was to assist the states in shutting out commerce in
products which they themselves had a constitutional right to bar from production
or sale. The court in Hammer v. Dagenhart observed that in each instance where
there had been a valid regulation of interstate commerce the use of the facilities
6
of interstate commerce was necessary to the accomplishment of harmful results.'
This observation was referred to in the Whip & Collar case. The court apparently assumed that the child labor act was passed solely for the purpose of controlling
local production and therefore concluded that evils at which this control of interstate commerce was aimed were not necessarily the results of the use of the facilities
of interstate commerce. Thus, by the observation of the court in the Dagenhart
case, there was justification in holding this act unconstitutional. On the other hand.
the court recognized that the act concerning convict-made goods was intended to
prevent unfair competition caused by importation into a state where convict labor
was prohibited. The evil in this situation did necessarily result from the use of
the facilities of interstate commerce, and, by reference to the above observation.
the court justified its holding that the act was constitutional. The reasonableness
of this distinction might be challenged since one of the purposes of restricting child
STAT. 313 (1890), 27U. S. C. A. § 121 (1927).
140 U. S. 545 (1891).

9. 26
10.

11. 45 STAT. 1084, 49 U. S. C. A. § 60 (1929).
12. 37 STAT. 699 (1913), 27 U. S. C. A. § 122 (1927).
13. 242 U. S. 311 (1917).
14. 247 U. S.251 (1918).
15. The petitioner in the Whip & Collar Co. case relied upon Hammer v. Dagenhart as authority for asserting that the regulation provided in the Ashurst-Sumners Act was unconstitutional.
16. 247 U. S. 251, at 271, 272, cited note 14, supra.
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labor was apparently overlooked-that purpose being to prevent unfair competition
within the state into which the goods were to be shipped. But the distinction,
whether weak or strong, did enable the court to uphold the restriction on convictmade goods without overruling the holding in the child labor case.
The decision in the Whip & Collar Co. case was heralded by some as suggesting
a constitutional method for federal control of child labor.17 To determine the
merits of this proposition the problems of child and convict labor should be compared. The objection to the use of convict labor in manufacturing is that the
products of convict labor can be sold much cheaper than the products of paid
labor with the result that the manufacturer using paid labor is injured.'s Child
labor restrictions are advocated both because of the ill effect such labor has upon
the child'0 and because of competition caused thereby due to the cheapness of
that labor.20 The states clearly have the power to control both convict labor and
child labor within their borders. The convicts, being under the care and supervision of the state, there is, of course, no doubt but that the state can control their
employment. 21 Child labor could be controlled under the exercise of the state's
police power, since such control is a health measure and is also for the economic
22
good of all in that it prevents unfair competition in marketing the finished product.
In either case, however, state control alone cannot prevent the unfair competition caused thereby. As to convict-made goods produced within the state
it is true such competition could be ended. But the prohibition of the use of
convict labor within state A will not prevent state B from using such labor and
from shipping convict-made goods into state A where the labor is prohibited.
State A could prevent the sale of convict-made goods after they left the original
package, but control of the goods after they are in the state and have been taken

17. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 6, 1937, § C, at 2: "The unanimous
decision of the United States Supreme Court in favor of the Ashurst-Sumners law,
forbidding the shipment of convict-made goods into states which bar their sale, may
turn out to be of far-reaching importance.
"It seems clear to us that this decision-which fits into the pattern of the court's
findings a year ago on the Hawes-Cooper Act-opens the way, under the Constitution as it now stands, to an effective attack on the exploitation of children in industry." St. Louis Globe-Democrat, January 5, 1937, § A at 4: "The victory of the
Ashurst-Sumners Act immediately raised hopes in some congressional quarters that
the court may after all permit federal legislation to regulate wages and hours without a Constitutional Amendment.
"Senator O'Mahoney of Wyoming who wants to carry out such regulation by
means of a system of doing interstate business said today's decision 'places the seal
of constitutionality' on his plan."
18. Ward v. City of Little Rock, 41 Ark. 526 (1883); Note (1931) 6 IND. L. J.
518; Legis. (1931) 44 H~Aiv. L. REv. 846.
19. Jones, The Child Labor Decision (1918) 6 CALIF. L. REv. 395.
20. Lawson, Child Labor and the Constitution (1922) 56 AM. L. REv. 733.
21. McKelvey, The Prison Labor Problem (1934) 25 J. CRIM. L. 254.
22. Sturges & Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U. S. 320 (1913); cf. Holden v. Hardy,
169 U. S. 366 (1898); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (1908); Bunting v. State of
Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917). Broad legislative supervision over minors is sup-
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out of the original package is difficult. The convict-made goods could not be
prohibited in the original package because of their interstate character.23 To fill
this gap in the state control and thereby assist the state in eliminating the evils
of the sale of convict-made goods, Congress passed the previously mentioned HawesCooper Act January 19, 1929.24 Its constitutionality was upheld in Whitfield v.
State of Ohio.25 The act provided that convict-made goods transported into any
state and remaining there for consumption should upon arrival in such state, be
subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such state to the same extent as
goods manufactured within the state and should not be exempt therefrom by
reason of being introduced in the original package. On July 24, 1935 the AshurstSumners Act 26 was passed. It was later held constitutional by the Whip & Collar Co.
case. With the aid of these federal acts, state control over the manufacture and
sale of convict-made goods is effective to prevent the unfair competition caused
thereby.
The child labor problem is very similar to the convict labor situation. Child
labor is much cheaper than adult labor;27 thus while a state certainly has the
power to prohibit any form of child labor within its territory it will still be subject
to competition of child-made goods imported from other states. Such competition
would make it difficult for the state to exercise its power to restrict even if such

ported by the view that they are wards of the state and subject to its control:
People v. Ewer, 141 N. Y. 129, 36 N. E. 4 (1894); State v. Shorey, 48 Ore. 396, 86
Pac. 881 (1906). Many states have statutes limiting child labor. ILL. REV. STAT.
(1923) c. 48, § 44: "No minor under the age of fourteen years shall be employed,
permitted or suffered to work at any gainful occupation in, for or in connection with,
any theatre, concert hall or place of amusement, or any mercantile institution, store,
office, hotel, laundry, manufacturing establishment, mill, cannery, factory or workshop therefor within the State.... ." Iowa CODE (1931) § 1526: "No person under
fourteen years of age shall be employed with or without compensation in any mine,
manufacturing establishment, factory, mill, shop, laundry, slaughter house, or packing house, or in any store or mercantile establishment where more than eight persons
are employed, or in any livery stable, garage, place of amusement, or in the distribution or transmission of merchandise or messages; but nothing in this section
shall be construed as prohibiting any child from working in any of the above establishments or occupations wher operated by his parents." KAN. REV. STAT. (1923) §
38-601: "That no child under fourteen years of age shall be at any time employed,
permitted, or suffered to work in or in connection with any factory, workshop, theater, mill, cannery, packing house, or operating elevators. . . ." Mo. REv. STAT. (1929)
§ 14084: "It shall be unlawful for any child in this state under the age of fourteen
years to be employed, permitted or suffered to work at any gainful occupation
except in, (a) The sale and distribution of newspapers, magazines and periodicals,
(b) Agricultural labor and domestic service, or any service performed for parent
or guardian."
23. Bowman v. Railway Co., 125 U. S. 465 (1888); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S.
100 (1890); Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1 (1897).
24. 45 STAT. 1084, 49 U. S. C. A. § 60 (1929).
25. 297 U. S. 431 (1936).
26. 49 STAT. 494 (1935), 49 U. S. C.A. §§ 61-64 (1929).
27. Lawson, Child Labor and the Constitution (1922) 56 AM. L. REv. 733.
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restriction was desired solely as a health measure. 28 It would, therefore, seem
that national restriction of child labor, uniform in all the states, would be the
only adequate solution of the problem. An attempt was made by Congress in 1916
to control child labor by grounding the restriction on the commerce clause of the
constitution.29 The act prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of any
article produced by child labor within thirty days after its production. This avenue
of control was declared unconstitutional in Hammer v. Dagenhart.30 In 1919
Congress attempted to control child labor through the taxing power by imposing
a tax of ten per cent of the net profits of the year upon employers who
knowingly employed during any portion of the taxable year a child within the
age limits therein prescribed. 31 In Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 3 2 this act was

declared unconstitutional. In 1924 a constitutional amendment giving Congress
power to limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years
of age was passed by Congress and was submitted to the states for ratification. 33
Since that time only twenty-eight states have declared for the amendment.
The similarity between the convict and child labor problems can easily be
seen. In view of the apparent inability of Congress to control child labor and in
view of the slowness with which states are ratifying the amendment, it is natural
that the convict labor cases would be studied with the hope that a constitutional
method of child labor control through congressional enactment might be devised.
By following the procedure taken in the case of convict labor, it is reasonable to
assume that transportation of child-made goods into a state where such was
prohibited could be constitutionally prevented. Thus an act subjecting child-made
goods to the laws of the state into which they are shipped regardless of whether
they are in the original package would probably be sustained. In such a manner
the evils of unfair competition within a state could be eliminated by state control.
There is an element in the control of child labor, however, that is not found
in the convict labor problem. The manufacturers of many states depend largely
upon marketing their products in states other than where the factories are located.
Should state A pass an act prohibiting child labor, its manufacturers, who depend
for their markets upon states B and C where child labor was not prohibited, would
be forced to compete with manufacturers in states B and C or manufacturers
in any other sate doing business in states B and C who produce with the cheaper
child labor. State A might therefore find it inadvisable to put its own industries
at such a disadvantage by prohibiting child labor or might find such prohibition
28. Jones, The Child Labor Decision (1918) 6 CALIF. L. REv. 395.
29. Child Labor Law, 39 STAT. 675 (1916).

30. 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
31. Tax on Employment of Child Labor, 40 STAT. 1138 (1919).
32. 259 U. S.20 (1922).
33. 43 STAT. 670 (1924): "Section 1. The Congress shall have power to limit,
regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age.
"Section 2. The power of the several States is unimpaired by this article except
that the operation of State laws shall be suspended to the extent necessary to give
effect to legislation enacted by the Congress."
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1937
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impossible due to pressure brought to bear by its manufacturers. Thus it would
34
seem that this method of federal control would not completely solve the problem.
JOHN H. FoARD
FEDERAL DECLARATORY

JUDGMENT LAW-CONSTITUTIONALITY

AND

APPLICA-

TION.-A recent United States Supreme Court case, Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford,
Conn. v. Haworth,' involved a dispute between insurer and insured as to their
respective rights under several life insurance contracts made between them. The
policies provided for total disability benefits. Insured ceased making premium
payments, claiming he had been totally disabled, of which alleged disability he
gave the insurer notice in due time. He contends, therefore, that by the terms of
the insurance agreements the policies remain in full effect despite stoppage of
premium payments. The insurance company denies that insured was at any time
totally disabled. Further, insurer states that the loan value of the policies has
been consumed to meet premiums as they fell due, leaving only one policy, with
a value of $45 as extended insurance, upon which insured can assert any claim.
The insurance company brought suit in a federal court upon the issues of insured's
disability and the continuance of the company's policy obligations despite insured's
non-payment of premiums. It asked a declaratory judgment under the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act,2 urging that delay in adjudication would be detrimental
to its interests, resulting in loss of evidence through dispersion of witnesses, and
requiring the company to maintain reserves in excess of $20,000. The complaint
was dismissed in the district court for lack of a "controversy" in the constitutional
sense. This dismissal was affirmed in the circuit court of appeals. On certiorari
the United States Supreme Court held the declaratory judgment law constitutional,
and found that a justiciable controversy was involved. This is the first clear cut
holding by the Supreme Court squarely upon the validity and effect of the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act.
Several courses were open to the Supreme Court when the instant case came
before it. I. It could hold the Declaratory Judgment Act unconstitutional as an
attempt to extend the court's jurisdiction to fact situations not involving a case
3
or controversy in the constitutional sense. II. It could hold the law constitu34. St. Louis Globe-Democrat, January 7, 1937, B at 2: "vVhat the latest
decision by the Supreme Court of the United States does emphasize is that the powers
of Congress are available to the states in helping them to shut out commerce in
products which they themselves have a constitutional right to bar from production or
sale. This is a long way from saying that all the states have to do to improve labor
standards is to pass a law prohibiting the entry into their sctates of products which
have been made in factories with standards less favorable to labor than those of the
original state. No such control over production in another state rests in any state
or comes within the meaning of commerce as it has been defined in the precedents
of the Supreme Court of the United States."
1. 57 Sup. Ct. 461 (1937).
2. JUD. CODE § 274 d, 28 U. S. C. A. § 400, 49 STAT 1027 (1935).
3. U. S. CONST., ART. 3 § 2. The following Supreme Court cases have by dicta
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tional, but limit its scope to (a) fact situations where consequential relief was a
ready alternative, 4 or (b) instances where no coercive relief would readily be
granted. 5 HI. It could hold the law constitutional and extend its application to
all fact situations, regardless of whether or not coercive relief would have been
available to either party to the controversy.6
How far does the holding of the instant case go? The court holds the law to
be constitutional. It finds that defendant would have been entitled to bring an
action for damages for benefits under two of the insurance contracts, and could
have sued in equity for a decree to declare all the policies still in being. Since one
of the parties was thus entitled to seek coercive relief, the court finds that there
was a justiciable controversy in the constitutional sense. It recognizes the power

inferred that there could be no constitutional procedure for declaratory judgments,
since such procedure contemplated the rendering of judgments in disputes that are
not "cases" or "controversies" in the constitutional sense. Liberty Warehouse Co.
v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70 (1927); Liberty Warehbuse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op Marketing Ass'n, 276 U. S. 71, 89 (1928); Willing v. Chicago Auditorium
Ass'n, 277 U. S. 274 (1928); Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 464 (1931). But
a holding of unconstitutionality in the instant case would have been unlikely in
view of Nashville, Chattanooga Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933), in which case
the court held, when squarely confronted with the problem, that it possessed the
power to review a declaratory judgment originating in a state court.
4. In the Nashville case (ibid), declaration by a state court of the constitutionality of a state excise tax had been asked by plaintiff, who appealed to the United
State Supreme Court after the state court declared the tax valid. In reviewing the
state court's declaratory judgment the Supreme Court found that the facts would
clearly consitute a "case"' or" controversy" if raised in a suit for an injunction against
collection of the tax, though by statute plaintiff was barred from injunction relief
in the state court. See note 7, infra. It has been argued, (1932) 45 HARv. L. R.
1089, that the court will limit its approval of declaratory judgments to the special
facts of the Nashville case, i. e., to situations where an injunction might have been
asked, but not to situations where no "wrong" had been committed or was immediately threatened so that coercive or executory relief would be possible.
5. A few state holdings have reached this result Kaleikau v. Hall, 27 Hawaii
420 (1923); Kaaa v. Waiakea Mill Co., 29 Hawaii 122 (1926); Brindley v. Meara,
198 N. E. 301 (Ind. 1935); Miller v. Siden, 259 Mich. 19, 242 N. W. 823 (1932);
Stewart v. Herten, 125 Neb. 210, 249 N. W. 552 (1933); Lisbon Village Dist. v.
Town of Lisbon, 85 N. H. 173, 174, 155 Ad. 252, 253 (1931); List's Estate, 283 Pa.
255, 129 Ad. 64 (1925); Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 At. 265 (1925); Matter of Dempsey, 288 Pa. 458, 137 At. 170 (1927); Leafgreen v. LaBar, 293 Pa. 263,
142 At. 224 (1928); Ladner v. Siegel, 294 Pa. 368, 144 Ad. 274 (1928); Taylor v.
Haverford, 299 Pa. 402, 149 Ad. 639 (1930); Int re Sterrett's Estate, 300 Pa. 116,
150 Ad. 159 (1930); Nesbitt v. Manufacturer's Casualty Ins. Co., 310 Pa. 374, 165
Ad. 403 (1933); Bell Tel. Co. v. Lewis, 313 Pa. 374, 169 Ad. 571 (1934); Allegheny
County v. Equitable Gas Co., 321 Pa. 127, 183 Ad. 916 (1936); In re Loughlin's
Estate, 103 Pa. Super. 409, 157 Ad. 494 (1931); American Nat. Bank & Trust Co.
of Danville v. Kushner, 162 Va. 378, 174 S. E. 777 (1934). There is much uncertainty, contradiction and confusion in Pennsylvania decisions. See Borchard, Declaratory Judgments in Pennsylvania (1934) 82 U. of PA. L. REv. 317.
6. This is the majority view both in the United States and England. See
BoRcHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTs (1934) 24-26, 147-149.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1937
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of Congress to provide new remedies where there is such a controversy. Thus the
Supreme Court goes as far as II(a) above.7
Will the court in future decisions extend the scope of the declaratory judgment
law to include fact situations where no coercive relief would be available to either
party? There is no dictum in the Aetna case disclosing a disposition on the part
of the court to go beyond the limit of the present holding. Yet, an extension of

the act to III above seems not only within the scope of the judicial power, but
also in accord with the legislative intent, and with precedent.
The power to decree some form of coercive or executory relief is not necessary
to the existence of a case or controversy in the constitutional sense. A "case" or

"controversy" can exist where no consequential relief is possible. Instances are
naturalization proceedings,8 suits of quia timet,9 boundary disputes,' disputes as to
the title of property,'1 appointment of a trustee 1 2 or receiver, 13 suit by a trustee for
instructions, 14 and others.' 5 In many of these examples the court's power to give
the declaration sought is vested in it by statute (for example, naturalization pro-

ceedings and the appointment of receivers). The constitutionality of these measures
is well established. So it is definitely within the scope of Congress' power to create
by legislation some sort of remedy declaratory in nature where no coercive relief
is ordinarily possible, and endow the federal courts with jurisdiction in such
instances. There is no apparent reason why this power should be abridged in
respect of declaratory judgments, so long as Article 3, Section 2, of the Constitution
limiting the judicial power to "cases" and "controversies" is complied with.
The requirements of a "case" or "controversy" in the constitutional sense, as
summarized in the Aetna case, 16 are a dispute "appropriate for judicial determina-

7. Compare this holding to Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S.249 (1933), in which the court was asked to review a Tennessee declaratory judgment, brought under the Tennessee Uniform Declaratory Judgment
Act, holding a tax valid under the commerce clause and the 14th Amendment of the
United States Constitution. The Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction, finding that
the issues would clearly have constituted a "case" or "controversy" if brought in
the form of a suit to enjoin the collection of the tax. However, by Tennessee statute
no injunction would hive been available in the state court. TENN. CODE (Shannon,
1932) § 1138.
8. Allen v. U. S., 47 F. (2d) 735 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931).
9. Southern Ry. Co. v. North Carolina R. R., 81 Fed. 595 (W. D. N. C. 1897);
Twin City Power Co. v. Barrett, 126 Fed. 302 (C. C. A. 4th, 1903).
10. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S.1 (1906); Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246
U. S.158 (1918); Georgia v. South Carolina, 257 U. S.21 (1922); Oklahoma v.
Texas, 272 U. S.21 (1926); Michigan v. Wisconsin, 272 U. S.398 (1926).
11. Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S.533 (1892).
12. Williamson v. Suydam, 73 U. S.723 (1868).
13. Republican Mountain Silver Mines v. Brown, 58 Fed. 644 (C. C. A. 8th,
1893).
14. Williams v. Gibbles, 61 U. S.571 (1858).
15. See Borchard, The Supreme Court and the Declaratory Judgment (1928)

14 A. B. A. J. 633.

16. 57 Sup. Ct. 461, 464 (1937).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss3/5
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non," as "distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract
character, from one that is academic or moot. The controversy must be definite
And concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.
It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through
a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what
the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." To be sure, in the ultimate
analysis (to paraphrase a statement of Chief Justice Hughes) a case or controversy
is what the Supreme Court says it is. And it is conceivable, in view of the court's
reluctance to recognize declaratory judgments in the past,' 7 that the court may
say that no case or controversy exists where relief could not be granted in the
absence of the declaratory judgment law.
But the requirements of a case or controversy set forth above appear to be
broad enough to encompass some situations where no remedy other than a declaratory judgment would be available. Examples are: a dispute between parties to
8
a contract as to whether plaintiff is bound to perform for a future period;' a
9
dispute as to the abrogation of a contract by war;' a dispute as to the kind of
20
currency in which payments falling due under a contract are to be made; a
dispute as to whether one party is subject to the regulatory provisions of a statute
alleged to be unconstitutional; 21 and others. 22 In all these instances the parties
are asserting opposing legal interests, and there is a definite, concrete and substantial controversy admitting of conclusive relief by a declaratory judgment. In
short, by the test quoted from the Aetna case, the dispute is in every sense
justiciable.
Each of the examples in the preceding paragraph has been held an appropriate
situation for a declaratory judgment. It is notable that in every case the controversy
is legal rather than equitable in its nature. But if the plaintiffs had been entitled
to equitable relief, they could have obtained an adjudication by the court of their
disputed rights by virtue of the equity power to grant conditional relief dependent

17. Liberty Warehouse Co v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 74 (1927), contains
dictum to the effect that a declaratory judgment law required the rendering of
advisory opinions. Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U. S. 274, 289 (1928),
contains dictum to the effect that a declaratory judgment law requires the determination of a moot case. Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op
Marketing Ass'n, 276 U. S. 71, 89 (1928). It can be argued that the Supreme Court
in Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933), was
driven to construe a state declaratory judgment as rendered in a "case" or "controversy" to escape the anomaly of a state court passing on the constitutionality of a
measure with no jurisdiction in the federal field to review the holding.
18. Societe Maritime et Commerciale v. Venus Steam Shipping Co., 9 Com.
Cas. 289 (1904).
19. Ertel Bieber & Co. v. Rio Tinto Co. [1918J A. C. 261.
20. Russian Commercial & Industrial Bank v. British Bank for Foreign Trade
[1921] 2 A. C.438.
21. Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, 156 Tenn. 278, 300 S.W. 565 (1927).
22. For further examples see BORcHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) 25.
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upon future events and acts of the parties.2 3 It seems, therefore, that the declaratory judgment law does not enlarge the judicial power in cases where equity has
jurisdiction, but extends it only in the common law field where the traditional
procedure allows nothing more than a judgment calling for immediate execution
24
and refuses to adjudicate a controversy where no "wrong" has yet been committed.
While it was not done in the Aetna case, it is customary, in determining the
effect to be given a statute, to give some regard to the intent of its framers. In
the debate on the Declaratory Judgment Act at the time it passed the House of
Representatives, its protagonists assumed that it would extend the jurisdiction of
federal courts to cases where no consequential relief would be possible, and a
declaration of right would be necessary to prevent one party from jeopardizing
his position. 25 The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee with regard to the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act clearly sets forth the committee's understanding
25
and intention that the measure extend to the situations under III above.
It is also customary, in determining the effect to be given to a statute, to
give some regard to the attitude of other jurisdictions regarding similar measures.
If the United States Supreme Court extends the application of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act to its broadest limits, it will not only be holding in accord
with the courts of England, 27 from which country we borrowed our declaratory
judgment law, but with the overwhelming majority of American authority.2 True,
the "case" or "controversy" requirement which must be met by federal courts is
29
unique, but as has been pointed out, the tests of justiciability applied in state
courts are quite as severe as the case or controversy test of the federal courts.
In summary, it is urged that the Supreme Court extend its holding in the
case of Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Hawortk (i.e., that the Declaratory
Judgment Act is applicable in the instance of disputes where one party would be
entitled to some relief in the absence of the declaratory judgment law) to situations
where no consequential relief would be granted but for the declaratory judgment
law. Such disputes, provided they do not involve too remote contingencies which

23. As examples of decrees granting such conditional relief, see Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U. S. 557 (1869); Talbot v. Hill, 261 F. 244 (App. D. C. 1919); Farwell v.
Harding, 96 Ill. 32 (1880); Lindell v. Lindell, 150 Minn. 295, 185 N. W. 929 (1921);
Bank of Alma v. Hamilton, 85 Neb. 441, 123 N. W. 458 (1909); Comstock v.
Johnson, 46 N. Y. 615 (1871); United Cigarette Mach. Co. v. Brown, 119 Va. 813,
89 S. E. 850 (1916).
24. See BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) 3 et seq., 308.
25. 69 CONG. REc. 2108 (1928).
26. SEN. REP. No. 1005, 73d CONG., 2d. SEss., May 10, 1934. Excerpts from
the report: The declaratory judgment "enables parties in dispute over their rights
over a contract, deed, lease, will or any other written instrument to sue for a declaration of rights without breach of contract, etc., citing as defendants those who oppose
their claims of rights. It has been employed . . . where it was not possible or necessary to obtain an injunction."
27. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay & Co., [1915] 2 K.B. 536.
28. 9 U. L. A. (1932) 121 et seq.
29. BORcHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) 272.
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must occur before coercive relief could be asked, should be considered justiciable
in their nature, and within the scope of the law as intended by its framers and
as interpreted by other jurisdictions.
VICTOR C. WOERHEIDE

MASTER AND SERVANT-FROLIC AND DETOUR.-When a servant causes injury
to a third person while in the conduct of his master's business, courts have for
many years placed liability for this injury on the master. Writers have experienced

difficulty in finding legal justification for this doctrine of respondeat superior, the
best explanation-a social justification-probably being Dean Smith's analogy to
the workmen's compensation statutes and the feeling that it is more desirable
socially to distribute losses occurring from the conduct of business over a large
group of the community rather than upon the injured party-the servant being
typically judgment proof. "It is reasoned that if this new cost item is added to
the expense of doing business, it will be ultimately borne by the consumer of the
product; that the consumer should pay the costs which the hazards of the business
have incurred." 2 Dean Smith feels that respondeat superior has accomplished an
end similar to that of the workmen's compensation statutes. Just as workmen's
compensation distributes losses that inevitably occur to employees engaged in
industry, so respondeat superior spreads those resulting to third persons from some
act of an employee. This idea is often referred to as the entrepreneur theory of
vicarious liability. 3 Under this theory losses will be distributed either by means of
insurance or an adjustment of the profit differential between costs and price-tothe-public.4
The question to be here discussed is the liability of the master for the acts
of a servant in those cases commonly known as the "frolic and detour" cases. 5
These cases involve the question of vicarious liability for torts of a servant which
occur when the servant is driving a vehicle in the course of his employment, but
deviates from the prescribed (express or implied) route. It is at this point that the
words "frolic" and "detour" serve to designate what the servant has done. The
problem is to determine whether the acts of the servant amounts to a mere
"detour" or whether the servant is on a "frolic" of his own. When will a servant's
deviation take the case out of the rule of master's liability? Obviously, industry
should not bear the cost of all torts committed by its servants. If a truck driver

1. Smith, Frolic and Detour (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 444, 716.
2. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (1929) 38 YALE

L. J. 584, 586.

3. TIFFANY, AGENCY (Powell's 2d ed. 1924) 100-105; Douglas, supra note 2,
at 585.
4. It should, perhaps, be noted that the frolic and detour principles purport
to apply both to industrial and individual servants-which shows that the entrepreneur theory does not fully account for vicarious liability.
5. This language may seem strange to Missouri lawyers, as the reported
Missouri cases seldom employ the terms, but legal writers have long used them in
classifying the cases in this particular field of the law of master and servant.
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purposely injures his personal enemy to satisfy a personal grudge, this cost is not
one properly allocable to industry. Industry should not bear the burden of losses
which, for lack of better designation, can be said to have occurred outside the
"scope of employment."- It is with this feeling, very likely, that courts inquire
whether the servant has left the employment of his master and has embarked upon
the performance of some business of his own-a "frolic" of his own--or whether
the deviation is so slight as to be merely a "detour" in the performance of the
master's business.
The idea behind "frolic and detour" is to determine when to limit liability
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. To what extent do the cases immunize
an employer? Various tests have ben suggested for use in determining if the
deviation of the servant amounted to a "frolic" or if it was a mere "detour."
Among the suggested tests are the motivation-deviation and zone-of-risk tests.
7
In motivation-deviation the requisite factors for liability are said to be: "(1) Satisfactory evidence that the employee in doing the act, in the doing of which the tort
was committed, was motivated in part at least by a desire to serve his employer;
and (2) Satisfactory evidence that the act, in the doing of which the tort was
committed, was not an extreme deviation from the normal conduct of such employees." Thus this test requires a consideration of the motive of the servant and of
the extent of his deviation, and would not hold a master liable if the servant has
discarded the thought of performing his master's business (with a view, say, to
doing something not for the master), especially if he has departed from what would
normally be the route taken. s But if the servant does not go too far off the route
and is still motivated, at least to some extent, by a desire to serve his master, the
master will be held liable. 9 It is at once apparent that the application of this test
leaves a difficult question to be determined, namely, what is the crucial extent of
the deviation; and that predictability of what a court (a fortiori, a jury) will do, is,
in many cases, impossible.
The "zone-of-risk" test is based more on foreseeability. Here, though the
servant be at the particular place of the tort as result of a deviation from the
prescribed route, the master is said to be responsible for accidents that occur in the
zone in which he can reasonably anticipate a servant to be, given the habits and
experiences of individuals generally and possibly of types of servants specifically.

6. Smith, supra note 1, at 461; Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 215, 241, 198
S. W. 854, 860 (1917): "It is elementary that the master is not liable for injuries
occasioned to a third person by the negligence of his servant while the latter is acting beyond the scope of his employment for his own purposes, although he may be
using the vehicle furnished him by the master with which to perform the ordinary
duties of his employment."
7. TIFFANY, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 106.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid. Query, however, if the master should escape liability when the
servant has not deviated, but is motivated by a purpose only of his own. Fidelity
& Casuality Co. of New York v. Kansas City Rys., 207 Mo. App. 137, 231 S. W.
277 (1921); Douglas, supra note 2, at 587.
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Dean Smith suggests this approach rather than that of inquiring into the servants
motive in doing the act or considering whether the act was done in furtherance of the
particular work the servant was employed to do.10 He feels this would confine the
master's liability to deviations of the servant which were probable, in view of his
employment, and that factors of motivation and deviation would merely aid in
determining this, i. e., motive, and measure of distance, time and direction of the
deviation. This consideration of what the master could reasonably expect, however, leaves us with as unpredictable a basis as does the motivation-deviation test.
Professor Douglas" views both these tests as a bit arbitrary in that they
state distinctions that, per se, have little significance from the administration of risk
angle, which has four important aspects-avoidance, prevention, shifting, and distribution. He feels that the principal question to be considered by the courts is
what limitations should be put on the master's cost of doing business and suggests
that the emphasis be placed upon attention to the function which the judicial process
is performing--the allocation of losses-always with an eye to avoidance, prevention,
shifting and distribution of risk. Again, it will be noticed, absolute legal certainty
is beyond reach.
A study of the Missouri cases reveals very little that can be interpreted either
as a conscious acceptance of the social problem of risk administration and cost
allocation or of the zone-of-risk or motivation-deviation tests.' 2 There is frequent
reiteration of an inquiry into "whose business is being done" by the servant at the
time of the act giving rise to the suit,' 3 an inquiry which seems to tie in very well
with the entrepreneur theory, but the courts do not announce the method by which
they determine this question.24 Nor do the opinions in the reported cases reveal
that charges to the jury are, or should be, made in terms any more specific than

10.
11.

Smith, loc. cit. supra note 1.
Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (1929) 38 YALE

L. J. 584.
12. In some of the Missouri cases the facts fail to reveal the exact circumstances under which the accident occurred, i.e., whether the servant was on the route
or off the route; thus making it impossible to determine the applicability of any
test. Fidelity & Casuality Co. of N. Y. v. Kansas City Rys., 207 Mo. App. 137, 231
S. W. 277 (1921); Vanneman v. Walker Laundry Co., 166 Mo. App. 685, 150 S. W.
1128 (1912).
13. Cable v. Johnson, 63 S. W. (2d) 433 (Mo. App. 1933); Nagle v. Alberter,
53 S. W. (2d) 289 (Mo. App. 1932); Ursch v. Heier, 210 Mo. App. 129, 241 S. W.
439 (1922).
14. The following statement shows the general approach to the problem: "In
some cases the deviation might be so slight as to authorize the court as a matter
of law to declare that the servant is still executing the master's business. Where
the degree of deviation is marked and unusual, such as where the chauffeur takes
his employer's car on a frolic of his own or on a joy ride, the court as a matter of
law would declare that he has departed from the scope of his employment.... The
cases falling between these extremes will be regarded as involving a question of fact
to be left to the jury." Fidelity & Casuality Co. of New York v. Kansas City Rys.,
207 Mo. App. 137, 231 S. W. 277 (1921).
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to find "whose business is being done." There is, seemingly, no test given them in
the court's instructions by which they are to make their findings.
15
It is difficult to reconcile the cases. In the case of Anderson v. Nagel,
defendant, a farmer, sent his son to a neighbor's house to inquire about borrowing
a hayrake. Defendant lived off the highway and the neighbor lived on the highway
at the intersection of the road which the son followed in getting on the highway.
When the boy left the neighbor's house, instead of returning home, he drove down
the highway a short distance to ask about a ball game, for his own personal ends.
On the way back to his home, but before reaching the place he was to turn off the
highway, the plaintiff was injured by the son's negligence. The court, in reversing
the trial judge for not sustaining a demurrer to the evidence of plaintiff, said that
the son had completely abandoned his employment; that this was not so slight a
deviation that it could be said that he was still serving his father while serving
himself.16
In Slothower v. Clark,1 7 the facts are practically analogous, but the court
reached a different result. Here defendant's chauffeur, after taking his master to
church, was told to go to the Commerce Building to get defendant's son and come
back to the church. The chauffeur drove several blocks in the opposite direction
from the Commerce Building to collect some money owed him. After getting his
money he started for the Commerce Building and on the way negligently injured
plaintiff. It was not shown how close he was to the Commerce Building, nor how
far off the route, at the time of the accident. The Kansas City Court of Appeals
upheld a verdict for $2,500 against defendant, saying that the chauffeur had not
quit sight of defendant's business. "He had defendant's directions in mind all the
while and was executing them, only going a roundabout way to do so" (i.e.,
"detour").
These cases can hardly be reconciled under either the motivation-deviation or
zone-of-risk tests, although there is one difference in the facts that might possibly
account for the decisions. In the Slothower case the servant had not, at the time
of the deviation and accident, arrived at the place he was directed to go, while
in the Anderson case the son had already performed what he was told to do before
departing from the route for his own purpose. It is doubtful that any legal effect
should follow from this distinction, but it may have some effect. It seems farfetched to believe that the defendant in the Anderson case would have been held
liable if the son had gone on past the neighbor's house to go see about the ball
game before inquiring about the hayrake, and had had the accident on the way
back, at the identical spot.

15. 214 Mo. App. 134, 259 S. W. 858 (1924).
16. The son "completely abandoned his employment. There was no duty of
his employment to be subserved upon this excursion. There was no business of his
master to be promoted by going in the opposite direction from that in which his
duty as servant required him to go. He was not making a mere incidental detour
or deviation on an errand of his own from the strict course of duty, so that while
thus going extra viam he was serving his master while serving himself.. . ." Anderson v. Nagel, 214 Mo. App. 134, 148, 259 S. W. 858, 861 (1924).
17. 191 Mo. App. 105, 179 S. W. 55 (1915).
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And yet this very distinction might account for the case of Urse v. Heier,'s
where the defendant, an undertaker, told his driver to take a coffin-box to a
cemetery, leave it, and return. The servant took the box to the cemetery, then
picked up some members of his family and started out in the country to get some
pears for his personal use. The accident in which the plaintiff was injured occurred
while the servant was on his way to get the pears. The court held that defendant's
demurrer to the evidence should have been sustained and said that no part of the
master's business was being served, but that the servant was on his way in pursuance
of his own purpose and that it appeared as a matter of law that he had departed
from the scope of his employment. But suppose that here the servant had gone after
the pears before leaving the box at the cemetery and had injured plaintiff on the
way to the cemetery? Would the court have said, as in the Slothower case, that
the servant was executing his master's orders, only going in a roundabout way
to do so? 19
In so far as the above cases intimate that the master is liable when the
servant has deviated before performing his master's business, they seem to lean to
the motivation-deviation test. There would, seemingly, be no such distinction drawn
under the zone-of-risk test, but there is not much indication in the Missouri cases
to tell us whether the latter test is accepted or rejected.
There may well be a tendency to give a plaintiff relief against a large corporation (or the master of a chauffeur) 20 when recovery would be denied in similar
circumstances against an individual. The New York case of Riley v. Standard Oil
Co. 21 may be a demonstration of this. In that case the truck driver for Standard Oil
was ordered to go from his master's mill to a certain freight yard to pick up some
barrels of paint and return at once to the mill. After the truck was loaded, the
driver, for no purpose that could conceivably serve the master, picked up some
pieces of fire wood, put them on the truck and took them to his sister's house, which
was four blocks in the opposite direction from the mill. After delivering the wood he
started back along the same route, but before he had reached the freight yards

18. 210 Mo. App. 129, 241 S. W. 439 (1922).
19. Of course, the extent of the deviation would surely be considered, as there
certainly should be no liability on the master if the servant was to go six blocks
on an errand, but went by way of a town fifty miles away, for a purpose solely of
his own. One of the weaknesses of the Ursch case, as precedent, is that the extent
of the deviation is not shown; but the court, on page 442, says this is not the
decisive question. In fact the Missouri cases seldom speak of the extent of the
deviation, and the language in this case would indicate that it is not of much
importance, but it would surely be a factor to be considered in determining whose
business was being done.
20. For instance, the New York Workmen's Compensation Law, in the 1931
amendment, excluded from the operation of the Compensation Law all domestic
servants other than chauffeurs in New York City. N. Y. CoN. LAWS (Cahill, Supp.
1931) c. 66, §3. In Missouri, however, domestic servants, including chauffeurs, are
specifically inculded. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 3303.
21. 231 N. Y. 301, 132 N. E. 97 (1921).
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he negligently ran over the plaintiff. The court here allowed the case to go to the
jury, who, apparently, found that the driver was "in the scope of his employment." These facts are very similar to the Anderson case.- Would the Riley case
have been decided the same way by the Missouri court, the Standard Oil Company
being the defendant? True the entrepreneur theory fits in well with liability of a
commercial employer, from the angle of risk administration, while it is not satisfactory when applied to a non-commercial employer. The Missouri cases, however,
do not furnish satisfactory data for determining whether this line of cleavage is
recognized.23
Other Missouri cases present no different facts upon which to base a discussion of the problem. The decisions involve only a finding by the court or jury
that the servant was, or was not, engaged in the performance of his master's
business and acting within the scope of his employment. 24 Nearly all of the cases
have been decided by the Courts of Appeal, there being only one or two decisions
of the Supreme Court on the subject25 (and not particularly helpful, at that). Until
the Supreme Court has ruled on more of the cases it will be impossible for a lawyer
to know definitely what factors are to be the motivating factors for Missouri courts.
Of course, the very nature of the problem is such that predictability of whether a
court will let a case go to the jury is difficult, 2e no matter whether (1) the court
frankly approaches the problem from the angle of risk allocation; or (2) back-handedly does so under verbal cover of so-called tests like motivation-deviation, etc.; or (3)
really applies the motivation-deviation test, or the zone-of-risk test, as if those tests
revealed rules which are ends in themselves. Nevertheless, it would be somewhat of a

22. But it will be recalled that the defendant master in the Anderson case
was a farmer.
23. In addition to cases already cited, see: Kaufman v. Baden Ice Cream
Mfrs., Inc., 7 S. W. (2d) 298 (Mo. App. 1928); Tutie v. Kennedy, 272 S. W. 117
(Mo. App. 1925); Gorry v. Boehmer Coal Co., 241 S. W. 976 (Mo. App. 1922);
Schulte v. Grand Union Tea & Coffee Co., 43 S. W. (2d) 832 (Mo. App. 1931).
24. Wrightsman v. Glidewell, 210 Mo. App. 367, 239 S. W. 574 (1922); Pinteardd v. Hosch, 233 S. W. 81 (Mo. App. 1921). Also, several of the cases involved a
slightly different problem, i.e., the case of a salesman or representative who is
furnished a car by his employer and has no specific route to follow: Brunk v.
Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 334 Mo. 517, 66 S. W. (2d) 903 (1933); Kilroy v.
Charles L. Crane Agency Co., 203 Mo. App. 302, 218 S. W. 425 (1920).
25. Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 215, 198 S. W. 854 (1917); Brunk v. HamiltonBrown Shoe Co., 334 Mo. 517, 66 S. W. (2d) 903 (1933).
26. If it does go to the jury, it is error to tell the jury that if the chauffeur
- was returning the truck by the most direct route and in the scope of his employment, the master would be liable even though the servant drove the truck away
from the master's plant for a purpose of his own. Kaufman v. Baden Ice Cream
Mfrs., Inc., 7 S. W. (2d) 298, 300 (Mo. App. 1928). An instruction in Tutie v.
Kennedy, 272 S. W. 117, 122 (Mo. App. 1925), was held proper which told the
jury that if Lilly (the servant) was in the performance of the duties of his employment and had not abandoned or forsaken the performance of such duties, they might
find that at the time of the collison he was acting within the scope of his employment, even though they might also find that at the time he was taking Frazier (a
friend of Lilly) home.
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guide-post to know which of these theories (or maybe some other theory) motivates
the court.
E. C. CURTIS
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-PROOF OF ESSENTIAL MATTER AS AFFECTING FAILURE

ACTION.-A plaintiff's petition fails to allege some fact essential
to his cause of action. At the trial, however, plaintiff introduces evidence which
tends to prove that fact and proceeds to prove his cause. A verdict in favor of
plaintiff is returned and judgment is entered accordingly. Defendant then discovers
the absence of the essential allegation and appeals on the ground that plaintiff's
petition failed to state a cause of action. An unbroken line of Missouri cases holds
that regardless of whether defendant objected to the introduction of this evidence or
was in any way surprised or misled by it, this judgment must be reversed and the
case remanded, with leave to plaintiff to amend.1 The obvious reason is that
failure to state a cause of action is a defect that is never waived and can be raised
at any stage of the trial. This ancient legal shibboleth provides the coin for the
judicial slot machine and out comes a reversal with perfect mechanical regularity,
regardless of the circumstances of the particular case. Not only is there a reversal,
but the cause must now be retried in toto,2 with the accompanying expense, delay
and burden on the trial court.
The reasons given for such strict application of the rule are said to be that a
defendant should not be required to meet issues not raised by the pleadings and
of which he therefore has no notice, and that failure to state a cause of action presents
a defect which is jurisdictional in its nature. Another ground not so often mentioned in the cases but which must be taken into consideration is the fact that
there should be a clear and intelligible record of what was involved and decided
in a given case.
The first reason suggests a basis on which some of the decided cases could have
been distinguished, had not the rule been applied so mechanically to all cases of
failure to state a cause of action. If a defendant is not surprised or misled by the
introduction of evidence on a given issue, why should he not be required to meet
that issue? A helpful analogy is to be found in the cases of immaterial variance
between pleadings and proof 3 and the statute4 on that subject which provides that
a variance is not material unless the advers party has been misled to his prejudice
and that it can be taken advantage of only by affidavit showing wherein he was
TO STATE CAUSE OF

1. O'Donnell v. Wells, 323 Mo. 1170, 21 S. W. (2d) 762 (1929); Lee v. St.
Louis Public Service Co., 337 Mo. 1169, 88 S. W. (2d) 337 (1935); Heinrichs v.
Royal Neighbors of America, 292 S. W. 1054 (Mo. App. 1927); Chandler v. Chicago
&Alton R. R., 251 Mo. 592, 158 S. W. 35 (1913); O'Toole v. Lowstein, 177 Mo. App.
662, 160 S. W. 1016 (1913).
2. Chandler v. Chicago & Alton R. R., 251 Mo. 592, 158 S. W. 35 (1913).
3. Fischer v. Max, 49 Mo. 404 (1872); Bammert v. Kennefick, 261 S. W.
78 (Mo. 1924); Aetna Inv. Corp. v. Barnes, 52 S. W. (2d) 221 (Mo. App. 1932).
4. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 817. Cf. Hibbler v. K. C. Rys., 292 Mo. 14, 237
S. W. 1014 (1922) (holding statute inapplicable).
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misled. But the reason underlying this statute and these decisions has not been
applied where matter essential to the cause of action was not pleaded.5 The rule
operates automatically to defeat the offending pleader. The same result is reached
in cases in which the question arises in connection with instructions or the admissability of evidence. Missouri has repeatedly held that instructions must embrace
only issues within both the evidence and the pleadings, that they must confine
themselves to issues raised by the pleadings even though the evidence may take a
wider range-this without regard to how the evidence was received or whether or
not defendant objected or claimed surprise. And the same has been held with
respect to the admissability of evidence on issues not raised by the pleadings: it
may be reversible error to admit such evidence. 7 It is submitted that all these
questions should have been decided on the basis of notice to the opposite party,
particularly in view of the Code provisions for amending pleadings to conform to
proof. These statutes will be considered below.
The second reason given seems the only logical ground for such consistent application of the rule: namely, that failure to state a cause of action is a jurisdictional
defect.8 Yet, while this view may provide a logical basis for the cases, it seems unreasonable and unsound in view of the present day functions of pleadings. At early
common law, the writ was indeed jurisdictional: one paid for the issues he had
determined. And later when the pleadings came to perform the function of the early
writ, the common law view developed, as a hang-over from the earlier time, that the
pleadings were jurisdictional. However, there seems no other valid reason for so
considering them where the facts upon which relief depends are proven to exist.
If lack of jurisdiction were the only ground for reversing these cases, one would
need only to look to the cases where the amount involved is falsely pleaded
to see the courts looking to the actual facts rather than to the words of the pleadings to determine whether jurisdiction actually exists, and the fallacy would be plain
enough.

5. Rundelman v. Boiler Works, 178 Mo. App. 642, 161 S. W. 609 (1913).
6. Overton v. Webster, 26 Mo. 332 (1858); Nugent v. Kauffman Milling Co.,
131 Mo. 241, 33 S. W. 428 (1895); Degonia v. St. Louis, L M. & S. Ry., 224 Mo.
564, 123 S. W. 807 (1909); Rosenweig v. Wells, 308 Mo. 617, 273 S. W. 1071
(1925); Krelitz v. Calcaterra, 33 S. W. (2d) 909 (Mo. 1930). In two cases, Stottle
v. Chi., R. I. & P. Ry., 321 Mo. 1190, 18 S. W. (2d) 433 (1929), and North Nishnabotna Drainage Dist. v. Morgan, 323 Mo. 1, 18 S. W. (2d) 438 (1929), opinions by
Judge White, indicated a relaxation of the strictness of the rule with respect to
instructions. These two cases are out of line with previous interpretations of Mo.
RE. STAT. (1929) § 1099, the so-called statute of jeofails, and apparently have not
been followed. See, for example, O'Donnell v. Wells, 323 Mo. 1170, 21 S. W. (2d)
762 (1929), in which failure to state a cause of action brought the classic reversal
with leave to amend. In the latter case, there was an objection to the introduction
of testimony, but this was overruled and the evidence accepted, the defendant
making no claim that he was surprised or misled.
7. Hibbler v. K. C. Rys., 292 Mo. 14, 237 S. W. 1014 (1922).
8. Chandler v. Chicago & Alton R. R., 251 Mo. 592, 599, 158 S. W. 35, 36
(1913).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss3/5

18

et al.: Comments
COMMENTS
The third reason for the rule raises the question of amending the pleadings and
the statutory provisions in that regard.9 It is said that one of the functions of the
pleadings is to provide a record of what was involved and decided in a given case,
and the importance of this function is obvious. It was to provide for this that the
amendment statutes were put into the Code. But another provision in the statutes
preserved the rule that failure to state a cause of action was a defect never waived
and available at any stage of the trial, 10 and this rule has rendered useless any
provision for the amendment of the pleadings in this respect after judgment has
been rendered in the trial court. In O'Toole v. Lowenstein," the action was trover
and plaintiff failed to allege possession or the right to possession. From the report, it
is not clear whether or not plaintiff introduced evidence on this issue, but the language of the opinion indicates that he must have done so. Judge Nortoni writes: "It
is quite probable that the legislature intended amendments should be made here" (i.e.
in appellate court) in cases of this character. But he goes on to say that the
amending statutes'2 must be considered in connection with section 1804, Revised
Statutes of Missouri, 1909,13 which provides that failure to state sufficient facts
is an objection available at any time, either in the trial or appellate court. Thus
the amending statutes have been construed as not permitting amendment to
supply an essential allegation in the appellate court, even if it was the intention
of the legislature that this should be possible. Essential matter may be inserted

9. The Code provisions with respect to amendments, Mo. REv. STAT. (1929)
§§ 817, 818, 819, 821, 822, 831, 941, 1099 and 1100 are very broadly worded but
have been strictly construed by the Missouri appellate courts.
10. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 774.
11. 177 Mo. App. 662, 160 S. W. 1016 (1913).
12. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929), § 1099, enumerates various omissions and imperfections which shall not be ground for reversal after verdict, among which are: "want
of any allegation or averment on account of which omission a demurrer could have
been maintained," and omission of "any allegation . . . without proving which the
triers of the issue ought not to have given such a verdict." This is followed by
section 1100, which provides that imperfections and omissions enumerated in
section 1099 shall be supplied and amended, if they do not alter the issues
between the parties, either in the trial court or the appellate court. It is with
respect to these two sections that Judge Noroni said that the legislature probably intended that amendments supplying essential matter should be allowed
in the appellate court. Section 1099 is the so-called statute of jeofails and has
been interpreted as merely declaring the common law rule that verdict will
aid a cause of action defectively stated but not a defective cause of action.
Welch v. Bryan, 28 Mo. 30 (1859). And ever since Andrews v. Lynch, 27 Mo.
167 (1858), it has been held that omission of an essential averment is not cured
by this section.
The doctrine of Ford v. Wabash Ry., 318 Mo. 723, 300 S. W. 769 (1927), that
where plaintiff would have been entitled to amend his petition to conform to facts
proven the appellate court will treat the petition as having been amended, was held
not to apply where the omitted allegation was essential to the cause of action in Lee v.
St. Louis Public Service Co., 337 Mo. 1169, 88 S. W. (2d) 337 (1935).
13. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 774.
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in the trial court, even after verdict14 or on hearing of a motion in arrest; but
thereafter no such amendments may be made. If such amendments may be made
before judgment in the trial court, no good reason is seen why they should not be
permitted in the appellate court if the fact was proved at the trial and the defendant
was neither surprised nor misled so that he was unable to litigate the issue and disprove the fact if he could. No Missouri case has been found in which both parties
met the issue and litigated it; but the language of the O'Toole case is such that it
seems unlikely that an amendment would be permitted even in such a case.
It is to be noted that the principle of aider by verdict is not applicable in these
situations. It has been expressly determined that this principle and the so-called
statute of jeofails'16 will cure a cause of action defectively stated but not a defective
cause of action.17 The entire absence of allegation is an objection equally fatal
both before and after verdict.
A few means of avoiding the extremity of some of these decisions are suggested.
One method which would lessen if not avoid the hardship is the remanding of the
case for retrial on the single issue which was omitted from the pleadings. This course
is adopted by several states' 8 and has even been approved by the Supreme Court
of the United States, 19 usually conservative in matters involving trial by jury. The
common sense of the device is obvious, and it has the added advantage of doing no
violence to traditional concepts of pleading. The record is put in order, the partial
new trial must be to a large extent a brief formality in most cases, while if defendant
actually can meet the issue he has full opportunity to do so. But the Supreme
Court of Missouri has expressly forbidden this procedure in actions at law, although
20
it has allowed it in suits on the equity side of the court. This distinction seems an
unsound one, particularly in view of the supposed fusion of law and equity under
-1
the Code. The dire consequences of permitting it, foreseen by Judge Lamm, seem

14. Merrill v. Mason, 159 Mo. App 605, 141 S.W. 454 (1911).
15. Golden v. Moore, 126 Mo. App. 518, 104 S.W. 481 (1907).
16. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 1099. See note 12, supra, for contents of this
section.
17. Welch v. Bryan, 28 Mo. 30 (1859); Andrews v. Lynch, 27 Mo. 167 (1858).
18. L. R. A. 1915 E, 240, and cases there collected. Remanding for trial of a
single issue is provided for by statute in some states and by judicial decisions in
others.
19. Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Co., 283 U. S. 494 (1931).
20. See 19 U. oF Mo. BULL. L. SEa. 38, for a complete discussion of the Missouri holdings on the subject.
21. In Chandler v. Chicago & Alton R. R., 251 Mo. 592, 158 S.W. 35 (1913)

Judge Lamm wrote: "In equity where the issues rest with the chancellor, and a
jury fills no office of substance, that course is sensible where occasion demands. But
in a case at law triable to a jury, to send the case below on one question of fact to
be tried out before another jury, leaving other issues of fact foreclosed by a former
verdict, is contrary to our statutory scheme for jury trials. (This is apparently
Lamm's own notion, for he cites no authority for this view.) It would result in
awkward situations and complications not conducive to the orderly administration
of justice." A better approach to the problem is taken by Justice Stone in Gasoline
Products Co v. Champlin Co., 283 U. S.494 (1931). Referring to the common law

rule which did not permit this procedure he writes: "Lord Mansfield, in applying
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not to have materialized even in actions at law in those jurisdictions in which this
procedure is adopted. However, the method of partial new trial leaves much to
be desired and is in reality only a makeshift concession to common sense in an
attempt to preserve traditional forms.
A better method would be for the appellate court to affirm the judgment and
allow an amendment in the appellate court (or order such amendment to be made),
thus protecting the record; but, as above noted, Missouri expressly forbids this
procedure. This seems the most feasible scheme, but requires a more liberal construction of the amendment statutes than the courts of this State have been willing
to give.
A final possibility would be for the appellate court simply to affirm the judgment, and hold the record of a case not conclusive in later actions and permit the
introduction of parol evidence to show what issues were actually litigated. This
would perhaps be a dangerous method-parol evidence will not always be available
22
for this purpose. But it would result in more economical justice in a given case.
The Missouri view of this question is taken by the great majority of states in
which code pleading is the form of procedure.23 Only a small minority24 feel that
proof of a fact in the trial court can make up for its absence from the allegations
in the pleadings. And while it is to be noted that no Missouri case has been found
in which both parties actually introduced evidence on and fully litigated the issue,

the common law rule where the verdict, correct as to one issue, was erroneous as
to another, said: '. . . for form's sake, we must set aside the whole verdict.' Edie
v. East India Co., 1 W. B. 295, 298. But we are not now concerned with the form
of the ancient rule. . . All of vital significance in trial by jury is that issues of
fact be submitted for determination with such instructions and guidance by the
court as will afford opportunity for that consideration by the jury which was secured
by the rules governing trials at common law. Beyond this, the Seventh Amendment . . does not . .. require that an issue once correctly determined .. .be
tried a second time ..."
22. Another method whereby these results are often avoided is the practice
of courts to interpret pleadings very liberally after verdict and if possible find that
essential facts are to be implied from facts actually alleged. See, for example, Martin
v. St. L. S. F. Ry., 227 S.W. 129 (Mo. App. 1921).
23. Ozark Fruit Growers' Assn. v. Tetrick, 130 Ark. 165, 197 S.W. 30 (1917);
Dodge Brothers v. Central Vt. Ry., 92 Vt. 454, 104 At. 873 (1918); Self v. Gilbert,
105 Okla. 140, 231 Pac. 870 (1924); Przybylski v. Remus, 207 Ill. App. 106 (1917).
24. Farmers' Say. Bank v. Planters' Elev. Co., 200 Iowa 434, 204 N. W. 298
(1925). The court said: "While it is true that the pleadings do not raise such an
issue, yet issue was raised and met by both sides in the trial of the case; hence the
issue was a voluntary one met by the evidence, and therefore was properly instructed
upon."
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yet there are cases very nearly approaching this situation 25 and the language of the
cases is strong enough to indicate that the Supreme Court would very likely reverse
the judgment in such a case and "remand with leave to plaintiff to amend." The
cases indicate a strictly professional attitude toward pleadings and a slavish adherence
to form regardless of function. The results in these cases seem not only undesirable
but unnecessary and avoidable even under our present system of procedure.
ROBERT A. WINGER

25. In Heinrichs v. Royal Neighbors of America, 292 S. W. 1054 (Mo. App.
1927), an instruction was based on a by-law of an insurance company, the by-law
not having been expressly pleaded. A stipulation had been entered into, however,
which provided that the by-laws should be admitted without further proof,
and the by-law in question was admitted in evidence without objection. On
appeal this instruction was held bad as being based on issues not raised by the
pleadings. This was an insurance case and the holding was necessary to the
affirmation of a judgment for plaintiff insured; but it shows the extent to which
Missouri courts have gone in applying the rule that instructions must not be broader
than the pleadings, the only exception apparently being the almost universal view
that the court may instruct as to contributory negligence even though defendant has
not pleaded it, when plaintiff's own evidence shows such negligence on his part. But
even here Missouri is strict and holds that plaintiff's evidence must clearly establish
his own negligence. See Pim v. St. Louis Transit Co., 108 Mo. App. 713, 84 S. W.
155 (1904), and Collett v. Kuhlman, 243 Mo. 585, 147 S. W. 965 (1912).
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